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 ABSTRACT 
Neoliberalism has provoked profound and diverse consequences for rural Mexico, escalating the agricultural crisis 
for producers and workers in various sectors.  Against this context, recent improvements in the sugar sector raise 
interesting questions about its relative economic success under the neoliberal paradigm.  This article contrasts two 
cane zones--one that experienced economic recovery and another affected by abandonment of the sugar mill--to 
argue that in the interstices of modernizing neoliberalism, cane growers and mill workers who were subjected to 
politics of exclusion struggle to ensure the survival of their culture, community, and economic livelihood.  [key 
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 Culture, Ideology, and Community:  The Dynamics of Accommodation 
 and Resistance to Restructuring of the Mexican Sugar Sector 
 
 Structural transformations induced by neoliberal economic policies are reshaping the Mexican countryside 
and augmenting social and economic polarization.  This fact is particularly striking in the sugar sector where 
neoliberalism provokes profound and diverse consequences for Mexican sugarcane growers and mill workers.  
With the privatization of sugar mills from 1988 to 1992, this sector experienced the worst economic crisis in its 
history, a crisis that affected both new private mill owners and cane producers.  Declining productivity, market 
disruption, bankrupt mills, and astronomically large debts owed by producers in the early years following 
privatization appeared to match crisis conditions associated with austerity measures in other sectors of the rural 
economy.  In recent years, however, many cañeros (cane growers) have recovered their losses, sugar mills are 
again profitably operating, and Mexico has regained its export capacity in sugar.  This economic recovery--at a 
time when other sectors of the rural economy continue to suffer the impact of economic restructuring--raises 
important questions about the apparent success of the sugar sector under neoliberalism.  In part, this achievement 
was accomplished by preferential economic support to more productive sugar mills and to cane growers with 
greater productive potential, while selectively eliminating others through the "politics of exclusion" (Gledhill 
1995:23), or what may be considered a strategy of "economic triage" (Gates 1993:59) by private mill owners.  In 
this paper I address the divergent experiences of cañeros and mill workers who continue to maintain their 
contractual relationship with sugar mills and those who, through economic triage, were excluded from what may 
be properly considered "la cultura cañera." 
 I argue that the implementation of neoliberal economic reform entails profound economic consequences, but 
just as important, involves a consequential impact on culture, ideology, and community.  Cultural traditions, 
ideological orientations, and the nature of community life were dynamically constituted during several centuries 
of struggle and conflict over the production of sugar cane.  Cultural ideologies held by diverse groups of cane 
growers, as well as by mill owners, were themselves subject to transformation as the sector passed from private to 





contributed to the current context, I contrast two case studies from western Mexico, one community in which the 
majority of cañeros recovered from the economic crisis which threatened to close the regional sugar mill in the 
early 1990s, and another community that struggled to survive after the bankruptcy and closure of its sugar mill.  
These two cases illustrate the multiplex effects of privatization and the complexity of forms that cañeros' and 
workers' strategies of accommodation and resistance take for the preservation of a cultural tradition and way of 
life. 
 The culture of cane production, constituted during the colonial era, emerged from a symbiotic relationship 
between sugar haciendas and rural communities.  The violent upheaval of the Mexican revolution culminated in a 
structural change in relations between the hacienda, that had depended on the work force of rural communities 
and campesinos, who depended on the hacienda for their livelihood.  The revolution redefined the ideologies of 
both mill owners and campesinos, as agrarian reform severed the unity of field and factory previously maintained 
by sugar mills.  Subsequently, economic and political hegemony within the sector shifted; yet whether 
characterized by economic liberalism under private control, or paternalism and populism under state control, 
relations with cañeros--who held rights to the land and provided the raw material to the industry, and mill owners, 
who controlled economic resources and decision making--remained contentious.   
 Mill owners, culturally defined as antagonists, exploited cane growers; and cañeros, in turn, were categorized 
by mill owners as dependent, lazy, illiterate, productively inefficient, and wasteful of economic resources.  
Elements of these ideological orientations persist, even as neoliberalism transforms relations among social actors. 
 Illustrative of these notions is the sugar industry representative who criticized cane growers for lack of a work 
ethic:  "They are lazy people.  Cañeros want to receive money without working."  Even union leaders may show 
lack of support for their constituency through adoption of this neoliberal rhetoric:  "The union needs to change the 
mentality of the producer.  Cañeros need to be more responsible, more like capitalists.  Cañeros need discipline 
because they resist change and much ignorance still persists.  The union must put into the head of each cañero that 
they respect the work requirements (union leader, Michoacán)." 
 Cañeros, on the other hand, relate their labor as cane producers to cultural identities and to their 





produce sugar cane for the industry, the contingent responsibilities of being a cañero, and the sacrifices they 
make:   
 The cultivation of cane has been a culture here in Mexico.  It is the most social of crops because in 
reality, that is where the society is--cane production maintains many families.  It is a culture; it has 
endured 300 years.  The cañero works, produces, and passes the land on to his sons [sic].  The rest of 
the family works in the planting, cultivation, and harvest--they have a hand in the raw material.  What 
gives life to many people and villages in cane zones is precisely the cane.  But to be a cañero is to 
suffer.  We have relied on our own family in our struggle.  Our strikes have been repressed, but this is 
our patrimony, our form of living.  To be a cañero is a culture." (cane grower, Michoacán).   
 These words reveal cultural knowledge regarding the tradition of cane production, its significance for 
families and communities, and its insertion in Mexico's history.  Below I outline the salient factors that gave 
shape to conflictive relations between cañeros, sugar mills, and the state, and how these relations were 
transformed over time. 
HACIENDAS TO AGRARIAN CERTIFICATES 
 Sugar mills, first established in Mexico in the 16th century, rapidly became the hub of the colonial economy. 
 Soon the hacienda emerged as the institution that structured access to land, labor, and capital, thus historically 
constituting contradictory relations among social actors:  the state, mill owners, and campesinos (rural producers) 
(Crespo et al. 1988, 1990; Landázuri and Vázquez 1988; von Wobeser 1988).  Although there are regional 
differences, numerous campesino communities resisted hacienda encroachment on their lands and the 
displacement of subsistence crops by sugar cane.  Since the early colonial period campesinos have been active 
agents in defending their culture and community (von Wobeser 1988).  Nonetheless, the state supported the 
accumulation of wealth and land by hacendados (hacienda owners), which guaranteed the social reproduction of 
the hacienda (Landázuri and Vázquez 1988, Melville 1979).  Indeed, the hacienda survived in some regions until 
the 1930s, and many cañeros recall a time when they or their parents worked as debt peons for local hacendados.  
While hacendados promoted the modernization of capitalist mills in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they 





groups in the Mexican revolution to overthrow the landed oligarchy.  The campesino component of the 
revolution, led by Emiliano Zapata, the martyred culture hero of the Mexican revolution, emerged in a region with 
a long cultural tradition of cane production. 
 After the revolution, the 1917 Constitution provided, through Article 27, for the redistribution of former 
hacienda lands to campesinos.  Most hacendados were able to retain a small portion of land but over time, 
particularly in the 1930s, the government allocated the majority of former hacienda lands to campesinos.  The 
creation of ejidos severed cane lands from haciendas.  In the process, it created a major structural change which 
displaced the traditional landed oligarchy and disrupted the former unity of land and sugar mill that had allowed 
hacendados dual control of field and factory.  Nonetheless, the state, mill owners, and cane growers continue to be 
linked in conflictive and accommodative relations over land, labor, and capital.  From the 1930s to the 1950s, 
cane growers with scarce resources were tied to private mill owners through contractual relationships under a 
system of oligopoly capitalism (Purcell 1981).  Over time, increased state intervention in the sector and a freeze 
on the price of sugar caused owners to decapitalize the industry and the government gradually took control of 
insolvent mills (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990; del Villar 1976).  State-owned mills, notorious for productive 
inefficiency and mismanagement, were operated under the ideological pretext of a state-campesino alliance (Paré 
1987).  Cañeros thus accommodated themselves to 20 years of state paternalism beginning in the early 1970s, 
wherein the sugar sector and the price of cane was subsidized.   
 The economic crisis of the early 1980s brought to a dramatic end extensive state involvement in the 
economy.  Under the neoliberal policies of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-
94), parastatal enterprises were privatized, supported by an ideology of free markets, private investment, 
modernization, productive efficiency, and the replacement of paternalistic relations with competitive 
individualism.  Within the sugar sector, these policies involved the sale of sugar mills to private investors, many 
of whom sought quick profits through speculation, and others who sought access to cheap raw material for 
processed foods and beverages.  Privatization resulted in the consolidation of 49 sugar mills into 12 groups, 
administered by private investors.  Owners of soft drink franchises were strongly represented in these groups:  





Grupo Beta San Miguel and Promotora Industrial Azucarera (Coca-Cola).  While families with a long tradition of 
sugar production operate some sugar mills, "neoazucareros" (new sugar industrialists) entered recently, in order to 
turn quick profits with mills purchased at depressed prices.   
 Eleven mills remain unincorporated into groups and the government still holds one of several mills that were 
returned to the state after privatization.  Three mills--El Higo, Mahuixtlán, and Melchor Ocampo--that were 
owned by the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), the national campesino union with which the cane 
growers' union (UNPCA, Unión Nacional de Productores de Caña de Azúcar) is associated, were declared 
bankrupt and resold to Grupo Zucarmex.  Grupo Escorpión purchased one of the two producers' cooperatives, 
Emiliano Zapata, and the other, El Mante, was sold to the long-time sugar industrialist and owner of Grupo Sáenz. 
 These sales brought to an end the involvement of cane growers as associates in the ownership of mills.  Four 
mills, according to neoliberal standards, were deemed inefficient and closed.   
 Sugar mills were sold in packages of both "good" and "bad" factories.  Grupo Beta, purchaser of the 
Quesería (Colima) mill, discussed below, owns mills that rank in the top ten and among the lowest ten in factory 
efficiency.  Among the last to be privatized were the five mills in Michoacán.  The Santa Clara and San Sebastián 
(Michoacán) mills were sold in 1992 to Grupo Porres; these rank second and third in the nation for factory 
efficiency; Porres' factory at Huixtlán (Chiapas) ranks 51, of 61 total mills.  The Lázaro Cárdenas (Michoacán) 
mill was sold to Grupo Azucarero Mexicano.  Grupo Santos purchased the facilities at Pedernales and Puruarán 
(Michoacán), one of the two case studies presented here.  At the time of purchase Grupo Santos was associated 
with Gamesa (a huge Mexican cookie and food processing conglomerate); the latter was subsequently bought by 
Pepsi.  Two other mills owned by Grupo Santos rank fifth and sixth for factory efficiency; a fifth mill is among 
the ten least productive.  Originally the Confederación Nacional de Productores Rurales (CNPR, formerly CNPP) 
was to enter a joint venture with 49% ownership in the four mills, but for lack of financing and because private 
ownership was the objective of restructuring, the cane growers' union was ultimately pressured into ceding 100% 
ownership to Grupo Santos.  At the end of the first harvest season, the owner closed the Puruarán mill, claiming 
that it was unprofitable. 





and excessive imports periodically flooded the sugar market, access to credit for cane production became more 
restricted, and modifications to Article 27 of the Constitution raised new questions about the relationship of 
cañeros to sugar mills and the Mexican state.  These modifications ended a state-campesino alliance that had 
traditionally guaranteed land rights to rural producers.  Competition in this new neoliberal economic space, as 
indicated by Singelmann, has forced cañeros to confront the withdrawal of customary political patronage and 
economic guarantees (1995:6).  As explained by a cane union leader in Michoacán, "The private industrialists 
came and the politics changed.  Our relationship is difficult; we can't accommodate very well and they don't 
accept the politics of the cañero, either."  The relationship between cañeros and privatized mills may increasingly 
be affected by changes in land use in future years, since modifications to Article 27 allow the rental and sale of 
ejido parcels (agrarian reform land).  In 1996, the Los Mochis (Sinaloa) mill was renting 80% of the cane lands 
from former cañeros; while this case is unique, the practice of renting land by sugar mills is on the increase.  
Industrialists show little concern for displaced cañeros.  One of the national representatives of the Cámara 
Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera (the national chamber of mill industrialists), when asked what 
had happened to ex-cañeros at Los Mochis, replied, "Many migrated out, but they are enjoying the money and 
drinking liquor with the rent they received for the land."  In numerous cases, mills are taking over the land of 
unproductive cañeros who are unable to repay debts; theoretically the land is to be returned when the debt is paid 
and the land is once again productive.  It remains to be seen whether outright land purchases and transfer of land 
to sugar mills will become more prevalent.  Today, most ejidatarios (former recipients of agrarian reform land) 
hold agrarian certificates which open the door for the first time to the legal right to sell former ejido land as 
private property.  The potential alienation of land from the cane grower was a particularly perilous situation in 
1992, when 14 sugar mills were on the verge of bankruptcy and cane growers, who once profited from the sale of 
cane to sugar mills, found themselves deeply in debt at the end of the harvest.  Many abandoned sugarcane 
production.  To some analysts, the crisis created by loss of productivity, debt, and changes in land tenure 
following privatization of the industry epitomized the failure of neoliberal policies.  By 1993, however, a quite 
different scenario had emerged.  New investments had seemingly rejuvenated the industry and former cane 






 What, then, does the changing structure of the sugar sector signify for cane growers and mill workers?  After 
the initial shocks that rocked the sugar sector in the early 1990s, by 1996 there was a trend toward stabilization 
and profitability for both mill owners and cañeros, on the one hand, and a less-observed polarization that was 
excluding traditional cane growers, on the other.  Maintaining an ideology of neoliberal modernization, 
industrialists and government officials alike are quick to point out the impressive achievements of the last few 
years.  These include:  greater surface harvested, more cane processed, more sugar produced, more sugar per 
hectare, more sucrose in the cane, higher factory yield, and less consumption of petroleum (see Table 1).  Many 
cañeros also recognize improvements in production and profits, as  former cane growers return and new producers 
enter production.  
[Table 1 here] 
 These data appear to lend credence to the ideology of neoliberalism, that is, privatization improves 
efficiency.  Essential to the neoliberal agenda is the selective integration of more productive cañeros into the 
newly privatized sector and simultaneously, massive layoffs of excess mill workers, and exclusion of cañeros who 
demonstrate less productive potential.  In the sugar sector, exclusion may apply to individual cañeros who are 
refused credit for continued production, and to entire communities, where mills are deemed inefficient and closed. 
 The selective process takes multiple forms and is differentially expressed in distinct cane-producing regions of 
Mexico.  Below I turn to two cases that illustrate the multiplex forms of accommodation and resistance that 
cañeros and mill workers deploy in responding to economic transformation. 
SURMOUNTING THE CRISIS THROUGH ACCOMMODATION 
 The Quesería mill in the western state of Colima was sold in 1989 to Grupo Beta San Miguel, which markets 
sugar to Coca-Cola, Nestle, and several Mexican food processors.  Though about to close its doors in 1990, recent 
investments to improve the factory and more exacting work demands have increased productivity of field and 
factory (see Table 2).  A portion of this increase is attributed to the recent closing of the Purísima (Jalisco) mill; 
its 600 cane growers deliver 60,000 tons of cane to Quesería.  Innovative use of containers for cane harvest, first 





large rocks and other debris that previously entered the mill, damaged machinery, and resulted in stoppages.  With 
new, higher-yielding varieties of cane, improved organization of the harvest schedule, and more rapid processing 
of cane, the mill and cane producers have seen profits for the past two years.  The mean profit for growers in 1996 
was $4000 new pesos (approximately $533 US) per hectare.  Debts owed by cane growers at Quesería totaled 
$1,200,000 new pesos (about $160,000 U.S.), in contrast to the historically highest debt of $5,317,940,890 old 
pesos (about $1,772,647 U.S.) in 1991. 
[Table 2 here] 
 To analyze these processes from the perspectives of cane producers and mill officials, it is necessary to 
consider the multiple forms of conflict, struggle, encounter, and the divergent ideologies and discourses that 
undergird the ongoing negotiation in the processes of accommodation and exclusion that characterize relations 
between officials and producers (de Vries and Zendejas 1995).  Mill officials, strongly influenced by neoliberal 
ideology, have developed cultural understandings of their relationship with cane growers. 
 The manager at Quesería, for example, attributed changes in the region to factors much broader than a mere 
shift in mill ownership.  Since they no longer receive subsidies, cane growers, he explained, are now "socios" 
(partners, or associates) of the owners.  Before, he claimed, cañeros abused the system by depending on 
government for everything.  They received more money in loans than needed or could be repaid and were often 
indebted to the mill.  Now the mill provides only partial credit for production and growers must pay a portion of 
expense out of pocket.  The policy, in accord with FINA (Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A.), sets differential 
amounts of credit according to the producer's yield, which encourages greater investment in higher-yielding 
fields.  The manager stated:  "We changed the mentality of the cane grower--now he is like a businessman."  In 
part, the mill manager attributed the positive change in cañeros' attitude to a cane grower capacitation program to 
develop human resources, established by Grupo Beta.  This program of formal courses, presented by 
psychologists, was designed to "sensitize" cañeros, to instill optimism, to develop cooperative thought, and self-
esteem.  This was particularly important during the crisis, when many cañeros were abandoning cane production; 
the mill manager appeared at these meetings to convince cane growers not to lose faith. 





Quesería mill denies credit and appropriates the land until the debt is paid.  The mill currently rents 200 hectares 
from ejidatarios for cane production, paying the landowner $700-$800 pesos per hectare.  While Grupo Beta 
claims not to be interested in purchasing privatized ejido lands, the manager views the sale of parcels as an 
advantage:  "He who buys land, works it."  Those who have not assimilated the neoliberal ideology continue to be 
perceived as backward, lazy, and inefficient.  The mill manager admits that adjustments to neoliberal policies 
were difficult.  Although producers initially received few earnings, he explains, "Neoliberalism is like the Bible; 
the Bible says that 'he who does not work does not eat.'"  The Bible is thus used to justify the fallout from 
neoliberal modernization--those who are subject to policies of exclusion. 
 Cane production in the state of Colima evolved over the years into a culturally embedded production 
strategy.  Transformations in the sugar industry since privatization led cañeros to redefine their strategies, 
struggles, and cultural ideologies, at times in response to, and at other times as proactive tactics to cope with the 
implementation of neoliberal policies.  In the mid-1980s, due to the many benefits they identified with sugar cane 
as a production strategy, cañeros were overwhelmingly positive about their relationship with the state and its 
patronage.  By the early 1990s, in stark contrast to previous years, privatization of the industry had produced an 
ideological reorientation of cañero culture.  Many cañeros expressed their opposition to the government, the new 
mill owners, and the declining economic position of cane growers by abandonment of cane production--which 
reached a peak in 1990-91.  With over half of the cañeros in debt to the sugar mill, they had lost their relatively 
prestigious economic position.  In the words of one cañero, the contradiction between the idealized past and 
present was expressed:  "I remember when I was a boy and they said 'God and Cane;' that's what they said.  I was 
a boy and I thought, 'What does this mean?'  Well, in that time, yes, they profited.  And now, everyone is left with 
pure debt." 
 If the contrast between the pre- and post-privatization periods (until 1989, and 1989-94) is remarkable, the 
changes from the early 1990s, when the crisis was at its zenith, and the current situation is equally striking.  
Cañeros have reformulated ideologies concerning cane production in part due to increasing profits and in part 
because the crisis in the rural economy discouraged alternative production strategies.  Cane is currently the 





declined from 566 in 1991 to 291 in 1996), causing an increase in out-migration; yet cañeros were returning once 
more, increasing their numbers from 1373 in 1991 to 1556 in 1996.  Thus, policies of exclusion and inclusion 
differentially affected factory workers and cane producers.   
 But economic triage was also practiced against cañeros, creating differences in perception of whether they 
are truly "socios" with the sugar mill.  Some cañeros, for example, perceive themselves to be "socios," since they 
depend on the mill for processing cane, yet the mill must depend on them for raw material.  The cultural 
definition of cañeros--as providers of the essential raw material--is notably prevalent among producers; cañeros 
readily realize that their traditional knowledge, their labor, and their cooperation are crucial ingredients in this 
major agroindustry that benefits the entire nation.  Others, however, culturally define their relationship with the 
mill as one of exploitation, rather than "socios."  A more critical cañero reflected on the mill manager's statement-
-that neoliberalism is like the Bible (he who does not work, does not eat)--and replied, "The Bible also says, 'take 
what you need for the day,' not accumulate!"  Ambivalence is more characteristic of others, who see themselves 
as "socios," yet say that mill officials view them as inferiors ("microbes," as put by one cañero). 
 A major factor in restructuring the relationship between cañeros and mill officials is the change, essential for 
cane production, in credit distribution.  Credit now depends on cane yields and producers are expected to pay a 
portion of their own costs.  Yet despite credit restrictions, land that in 1990 was abandoned for cattle raising or 
subsistence maize production was being reconverted to cane by 1996.  A constant complaint in 1990, because of 
the cost, was the demand by the mill to replant cane fields with new varieties.  Though the majority resisted doing 
so, by 1996 many cañeros had replanted or planned to do so with the new, higher-yielding varieties.  Today there 
is talk of the improved quality of new varieties.  The planting of new cane represents a significant change, since it 
requires that a substantial cost be borne without credit from the mill.  In contrast to mill officials, who believe in 
making cañeros individually responsible for investing in their production, a number of cañeros complain that 
those who lack resources for cane cultivation suffer decreasing yields, fall into debt, and will be denied further 
credit.  A prevalent fear exists:  in restricting credit and repossessing cane fields for which debts are not paid, 
ultimately, those with more resources will accumulate land, and those with fewer will lose access.  One cañera put 





government [that gave them] is going to take them from us."  Nonetheless, while some complain about not 
receiving sufficient credit for production, many cañeros acquiesce with new mill policies, acknowledging that 
with less credit, fewer are in debt; even they have accommodated to the charge of mill officials--cañeros wasted 
the money that they formerly received from the mill.  One cañero explained that it was "hard" the first year, but 
now they are saving money by force.   
 In 1992, the Mexican Constitution was revised, allowing for the regularization and titling of ejido parcels; 
ejido members may now vote to privatize their parcels.  As well, the sugar mill began to require ejidatarios to 
present the new land title (Certificado Parcelario) before receiving credit for cane production.  Though most 
ejidatarios retain their land, others have converted parcels to private property (Dominio Pleno) and sold them.  
The majority of ejidatarios, including cañeros, express positive attitudes toward the modifications to Article 27.  
Since ejidatarios received their titles in 1993, an often heard comment is, "Now the land is mine; I can do with it 
what I want."  Yet when asked about the long-range consequences, the responses were overwhelmingly negative.  
A cañero who agreed with privatization explained, "People are now free to sell their parcels, but the land could 
end up in the hands of the wealthy.  Before there were haciendas and large landowners; it could return to the same 
situation."  Dissident voices, however, criticize the privatization of ejido parcels.  The few that opposed it--a 
stronger tendency among those with a longer family tradition of cane culture--felt pressure to comply with the 
majority decision to privatize.  One cañera, whose father took part in the violent struggle for ejido land that ended 
in the assassination of several campesinos from her community, related: 
 They screwed us.  We had to agree with the majority.  Later, they are going to chase us from the ejido; 
they are going to crush us.  The government is going to be left with the ejido.  My father left the land to 
me to help me, not for me to sell.  My parents fought for the land, they suffered, and I want to pass it to 
my sons.  In the revolution, the people, without eating--man! how they suffered.  How easily the people 
sell the land now.  I don't want to sell.  I was a widow with four sons and I was enduring the hunger, but 
it would have pained me to sell it. 
 Along with their concern over the alienation of ejido lands, cañeros of the zone preoccupy themselves with 





held by mill officials and cañeros are also contradictory.  Many growers see cane production as unsustainable 
(e.g., annual burning of cane fields, deforestation, drying of soils, destruction of animal habitats, and air 
pollution).  The mill manager, however, rationalized these well-known criticisms:  "Sugar mills," he claimed, "are 
ecological, because the cane plant produces oxygen all year long.  This is not recognized by environmentalists."  
This view is not shared by cañeros of the zone, for whom this benign perception excludes the realities of health 
hazards posed by excessive use of agrochemicals.  The sugar mill now uses a plane to spray fields and combat 
cane plagues, but fails to warn cañeros and workers laboring in the fields.  On these occasions workers observe 
that small animals die and humans suffer severe skin rashes.  According to villagers, the cancer incidence has 
increased dramatically in recent years.  Thus the environmental ideology neglects the health of cañeros, otherwise 
considered "socios" of the mill. 
 Just as neoliberalism forces cañeros to culturally redefine their relationship to land and economic resources, 
it also presents a challenge to their identity as autonomous actors.  Illustrative of this is the extension of mill 
control over cañeros, from credit and production decisions, into the arena of self-identity.  Grupo Beta established 
capacitation courses to increase optimism and ensure stability among cane producers.  Two textbooks (Aguilar 
1995a; 1995b) published by Grupo Beta San Miguel, "Optimism Predominates" and "Self-Esteem Predominates," 
were used in these classes.  The texts, written at an elementary level, included various quizzes and exercises; one 
question asked, "Do cañeros feel like socios?" followed by, "Do you know how we are socios?"  The text then 
explains that all CNC members are "socios" in UNAGRA, the new credit union that operates through the mill.  
The partnership, thus defined, is narrowly economic.  A very self-confident and active cañera who serves on the 
board of the cane growers' union and who had attended the course, received high scores for self-esteem.  Others, 
she explained, who received low scores, were mortified by their performance.  While the objective was to make 
cañeros feel optimistic and instill a sense of responsibility (for example, not taking unnecessary credit that would 
lead them into debt), the result was offensive and patronizing.  Cultural interaction between mill officials and 
cañeros is still tinged with ethnocentric attitudes; it is the cañeros who must assimilate to the culture of 
neoliberalism. 





opposed interests or reservations about the long-range impact of changes in land tenure and access to credit.  In 
general, however, both mill personnel and cañeros demonstrate heightened satisfaction with recent developments, 
despite environmental problems.  Cañeros in Colima have accomodated to the neoliberal policies of the sugar 
industry and with the exception of inefficient producers who were excluded from sugar production, a substantial 
majority are again earning profits.  Yet in other regions, neoliberal policies have spelled economic doom to entire 
communities and led mill workers and cañeros to resist policies of economic triage, a case to which I turn below. 
RESISTING ECONOMIC TRIAGE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY SURVIVAL  
 "It is very delicate."  "That is a political issue."  These are the responses by industry officials in Mexico City 
and mill and union personnel in Michoacán when asked about the Puruarán sugar mill.  After informing me that 
"The community lives from the sugar mill," an official of the Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucareras, who 
was willing to talk about Puruarán, explained that the closure of the Puruarán sugar mill "really had no effect on 
the community." 
 Puruarán, with a population of 15,000, has a cultural tradition of cane production going back almost 300 
years.  Spaniards founded the Hacienda of Puruarán for the production of sugar cane in 1715.  Over the years, the 
culture of cane production, along with its knowledge, traditions, and social relations, passed from generation to 
generation.  Community members, most of their lives, labored in the mill or the field, as did their parents before 
them.  Hacienda Puruarán, owned by Aurelio and Gerardo Bastarrachea since 1883, was sold to Joaquin Oseguera 
during the final years of the revolution.  Oseguera maintained the hacienda until 1923 when it was subsequently 
acquired by José Gómez Arreola, and later, by an American, Tomás B. Boyd.  Campesinos recall that Boyd 
allowed cattle to destroy their maize and bean crops because he wanted land planted in cane.  For 18 years, from 
1926 to 1944, before being granted ejidos, campesinos struggled for the redistribution of hacienda lands.  When 
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz suspended credit to the mill in 1966, it was temporarily abandoned.  The governor 
at that time, Augustín Arriaga Rivera, reopened the mill by declaring it for the benefit of workers, cañeros, and 
the community (Caso 1987).  Mill workers and cañeros consider the mill the patrimony of the nation, yet, this 
community has struggled against the consequences of a neoliberal policy of exclusion for the past four years.  The 





 The privatization of Mexican sugar mills epitomizes the neoliberal economic model, since most mills were 
transferred from the state to various corportate groups, headed by wealthy and politically powerful industrialists.  
Puruarán, under state control for 21 years, was privatized in 1992 and was then sold to a northern industrialist and 
senator from the state of Nuevo Leon.  The sale of Ingenio Puruarán falls under the rubric of neoliberalism in yet 
another way:  the senator received thanks--in the form of the purchase of four sugar mills--in return for his 
support leading to modification of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.  He not only supported the 
modifications but played a role in designing the formula to title and transfer ejido parcels into private property.  
While privatization of ejido land is voluntary, possession of land collateral subjects ejidatarios indebted to 
captialist enterprises or banks to potential confiscation of their land. 
 The sale proposal stipulated that Empresas Gamesa, the corporate group that was to purchase the mill, would 
acquire 51% ownership, leaving CNPP cane producers with 49% ownership.  Four mills were included in the 
purchase--Alianza Popular (San Luis Potosí), Bella Vista (Jalisco), Pedernales (Michoacán), and Puruarán.  But 
national CNPR leaders signed an agreement with the purchaser giving him full ownership of the four mills.  Mill 
workers and cane growers were incensed.  They considered it a fraudulent action that hurt the entire nation.  
Clauses VIII, XVI, XIX, and XX of the sale contract, in particular, commit the purchaser to preserve the industry 
and improve the industrial unit, so that it continues to be productive and generate employment.  In this sense, 
former mill workers and growers view the sale as unconstitutional--since these are important obligations that the 
purchaser should uphold for the good of the nation. 
 Those whose livelihoods were affected by the sale found it incomprehensible that Salinas de Gortari sold all 
the sugar mills in the country without taking into consideration the damage that it would create for families in 
cane-growing regions.  According to some residents of Puruarán, salinismo (the neoliberal politics of President 
Carlos Salinas Gortari) brought uncertainty to the majority of Mexicans, sacking the nation, and "not benefitting 
the poor, but making them poorer."  The May 14, 1992 visit of Salinas de Gortari to the city of Tacámbaro 
presents a peculiar irony for mill workers and growers.  The visit culminated in a development plan that was to 
create employment and help the economies of 11 municipalities; a few weeks later (May 31), the new owner 





 In fact, the Puruarán mill, like other state-managed enterprises, operated in the red.  Community members 
explain that the mill is capable of generating profits, and that research demonstrates the potential utility of the 
mill.  Former mill workers and cañeros moreover, share a belief that the profits were directed to personal uses or 
election campaigns.  Mill owners, they assert, together with politicians, made a "great business" of changing 
numbers from black to red.  The Comisariado Ejidal of Puruarán claimed that, "It is certain that the mill was in the 
red, but this is what they [the mill owners] did, because there was much plundering of money, both in the field 
and in the factory.  They did their dirty work, hurting the workers, and all this made the sugar mill unprofitable."   
 The rationale for subjecting thousands of residents of the region to unemployment can be measured against 
data that reveal the place of Ingenio Puruarán among other mills.  In 1992, the year the mill closed, the average 
yield in tons of cane per hecatare at Puruarán was 91.63, in contrast to the national average of 74.34; only 14 mills 
surpassed Puruarán's yields, and 48 had lower averages.  While the factory yield (the amount of sugar produced 
per ton of cane) at Puruarán was 9.70, the national average was 9.28; only 18 mills surpassed Puruarán and 44 
achieved lower factory yields.  Also in 1992, extraction of sucrose during the processing of cane at Puruarán was 
13.01%, while the national average was 12.36%.  Puruarán was ranked twelfth in the nation.  Ex-workers criticize 
the owner for not carrying out the necessary procedures to determine the mill's potential profitability; however, he 
intends to dismantle the mill in order to utilize its parts in the nearby Pedernales mill, purchased as part of the four 
mill package. 
 The 1992 closing of the Puruarán mill condemned inhabitants of the Turicato region to impoverishment.  
The mill, the economic hub of the region, benefitted 2,260 cane growers, 800 cane cutters, 56 truck drivers, 160 
drivers of animal-pulled vehicles, 28 tractor operators, 300 factory workers, 60 temporary mill workers, 35 
unionized employees, and 75 office personnel.  A total of 3,774 persons were sustained by direct employment in 
the mill.  The economic ramifications, however, extend beyond Turicato to the adjacent municipio of Tacámbaro 
and parts of Ario de Rosales and Uruapan.  The economic activity and spillover effects directly and indirectly 
benefitted 36,050 inhabitants of the region,  in addition to employment created throughout the state and 
nation related to the distribution, consumption, and use of materials produced, including sugar and syrup.  While 





largely unaccounted for, except by those who bear the burden of unemployment.   
 Though many cane growers elected to transport their cane to the Pedernales mill, 11 km. from Puruarán, 
about 900 cañeros quit cane production and abandoned 939 hectares for other uses--maize and pasture.  One 
thousand nine hundred cañeros (4800, including those from Pedernales) delivered their cane to the Pedernales 
mill.  In contrast to the economic decline at Puruarán, the Pedernales mill experienced a record harvest in 1996 
(see Table 3).   
[Table 3 here] 
 The majority of mill workers at Puruarán were also cane growers.  Because the average cane field in the area 
is only one hectare, the loss of employment was critical.  According to the Federal Work Law, workers are to be 
indemnified according to the number of years worked; but some employees who had worked their entire lives at 
the mill, complained that released workers received only half what was due.  Out-migration increased but most 
migrants failed to find employment and returned after one or two months.  Some told me, "We see the desperation 
of the people.  The working class is ending because there is no work."  As one ex-worker explained, "If the mill is 
going to stay closed, well, in the end, this is going to be a ghost town."  Cultural discourse evokes contradictory 
notions regarding former mill workers and producers.  A FINA official in Mexico City stated simply, "It is 
necessary to make adjustments" to unemployment created by mill closings.  But disaccord with the interests of 
cane growers is not uniform, even within the union organization, as asserted by a national UNPCA representative: 
 "UNPCA should defend this culture with its nails and its teeth."  Though the national union struggled to prevent 
the closure of mills, they could not support the Puruarán mill.  The takeover of the factory (discussed below) 
violated constitutional rights and the union did not want to appear as the purveyor of these actions.  Twenty mills 
were at risk of being closed and by supporting the Puruarán takeover, "We were going to violate 20 mills," 
explained the representative. 
 Clearly, the closing of the Puruarán mill affected the entire community.  It created a series of grave social 
problems.  Thousands of unemployed workers and their families faced the difficulty of living in hunger.  Average 
income was $20 pesos per family per day before the closure of the mill; now, many are without income.  While 





available through the mill).  School dropouts and delinquency are more common.  According to local workers, 
businesses and services were affected by a lack of cash flow:  40% have closed since the closure of the mill.  One 
former worker from the mill informed me, "There are people that are crying because they don't even have enough 
to pay for the electricity.  The closure of the mill left a town dying because there is no work."   
 Puruarán, then, was one of several communities in the nation that was relegated by the neoliberal paradigm 
to the politics of exclusion.  It was in the interstices of such transformative processes that people began to draw 
upon their cultural traditions and confirm their unity as they engaged in new strategies of confrontation and 
negotiation.  On December 7, 1992, some 60 mill workers, cane growers, and townspeople--including women--
decided to illegally occupy and operate the sugar mill.  As they returned the mill to operation, gunmen fired on 
three workers.  They were detained by police, but released one hour later and their weapons returned.  Those 
involved in the takeover, lacking the services of technicians, engineers, and chemists, repaired machinery and 
processed $700,000 new pesos (about $93,333 U.S.) worth of sugar.  Enough sugar was produced to make partial 
payments to cane growers.  Workers, in response to the mill owner's statement that they were "illiterate," and 
indicating the 50 kg. bags of sugar stacked to the ceiling of the warehouse, remarked, "We ignorant workers made 
all this."   
 The mill owner immediately contacted the state governor, who ordered in the police.  Those in the mill were 
arrested, jailed, and severely beaten.  Others were taken from their homes at night.  Of those arrested and beaten, 
an elderly man with heart problems had to be hospitalized; and another individual died.  Following the arrests, 
twenty police were ordered to guard the mill.  They cut electric cables and removed machinery to prevent the 
functioning of the mill.  Although the police took 40 tons of sugar, the remaining sugar, now four years old, 
remains stacked in the warehouse collecting dust.  The workers themselves cannot sell this sugar, since its 
production involved the illegal takeover of the mill, the private property of the owner. 
 This crisis has increased unity among community members.  The community, including former workers, 
cañeros, and townspeople, is now united into a formal organization, the Committee For the Reopening of Ingenio 
Puruarán.  In their support, other groups have petitioned for government intervention to prevent economic 





become teachers, and dentists, thanks to wages parents earned in the mill.  The organization negotiates at local, 
state, and federal levels to resolve the social repercussions of the mill's closing.  Three times the Committee for 
the Reopening of Ingenio Puruarán has visited the offices of the president in Mexico City, though the offices of 
the federal government, the Hacienda, Financiera Nacional, and the Cámara de Diputados have given no response. 
 They request that the sale contract be reviewed, in light of the fact that it has not been respected.  As one person 
explained, "In each one of the petitions we requested solutions given our constitutional right to petition and the 
response of the government is to ignore us." 
 The government has made an effort, however, to support micro-businesses to generate employment in the 
community.  Money was loaned for 15 small businesses, but all have failed due to lack of cash flow.  The 
government offered to install trapiches, or small-scale, labor-intensive mills for the production of piloncillo (an 
unrefined form of sugar), but these already existed in the region and most had been abandoned.  One social 
program provided cows, but they were too old to be of value.  A carpenter shop to make furniture could not 
function because with high unemployment in the region, there was a lack of demand.  Even a bakery could not 
survive the stressed economy of the community.   
 When cañeros and mill workers held a meeting in February 1994 to discuss their political options, one 
hundred soldiers entered Puruarán and dozens of police guarded the mill.  Consequently, several years of 
negotiating with various federal and state agencies proved fruitless.  On June 30, 1996, workers, "tired of listening 
to lies and failing to receive a concrete solution," again took over the Puruarán mill.  Again the police invaded the 
mill, but the workers peacefully forced them to leave.  After two days, they agreed to turn the mill over to state 
authorities.  A decision was reached, with the approval of the governor, that a permanent guard of 30 ex-mill 
workers could maintain vigilance within the confines of the sugar mill to prevent further sacking of the 
installations.   
 Two years later, in May of 1996, another effort was made to negotiate a solution.  The mill owner, cañeros, 
and ex-mill workers, attended a joint meeting at which workers proposed three alternatives to the owner:  1) to 
reopen the mill and operate it himself; 2) to sell the mill to cane growers, or 3) to rent the mill to them.  Cañeros 





sustaining the community were assured by keeping the mill open (Hernández 1996:10).  However, the mill owner 
rejected all three alternatives on purely economic grounds.  Sugar mills were sold in packets of both "good" and 
"bad" mills.  Many of the mills were antiquated, thus there is an incentive to invest in the more profitable mills, 
while leaving the less productive mills to benign neglect or to close them.  The industrialist who purchased this 
group of mills is interested primarily in sugar to supply Empresas Gamesa.  Less concerned with the social 
repercussions, after visiting with Puruarán residents for three days, he concluded that the standard of living in the 
community had improved.  Locals, in contrast, maintain that it has worsened considerably. 
 Despite these events, workers are currently attempting to repair the mill without pay, to maintain their source 
of employment.  The mill owner, however, threatened in July, 1996 that if the organization continues to insist on 
reopening the factory, he would leave the cane of the region, as well as that of the Pedernales mill, unprocessed.  
These are not empty threats, for the leaders of the organization have been harassed, parts of the factory have 
already been dismantled, and many have been refused credit for cane production.  Recently, he warned that if the 
situation at Puruarán is not resolved, he will close down the Pedernales mill.  While the mill owner remains 
insensitive to the needs of the community, the community refuses to disappear.  According to one cañero, "We 
campesinos have experience, we know what we are facing, and we are willing to demonstrate that we are capable 
of succeeding in this project, which is very significant for Michoacán."  People of Puruarán argue that generations 
of cane culture cannot be destroyed by the capriciousness of one person.   
 Certain that the mill is a viable, potentially profitable factory (several studies demonstrate that the Puruarán 
mill has the capacity to compete in quality and capacity of production with other mills of the country), the 
community searches for funds to acquire the installation; however, its legal status prevents them from acquiring 
the necessary financing.  The committee continues to fight for the expropriation of the mill for the public benefit.  
As one member of the committee explained, "We need work in order to escape from the poverty in which we find 
ourselves.  We don't ask for handouts or subsidies, we simply want to work.  Definitively, yes, we feel the need to 
produce; we feel the need to survive."  Workers and cane growers in Puruarán share a common precept, "If we are 
going to die slowly of hunger, we prefer to die with dignity, from a bullet, but struggling."  Ex-workers guarding 





failure in the neoliberal grade book, but local residents argue for a different agenda than the acquisition of huge 
profits--resolution of the social problem and survival of the people of the region. 
CONCLUSION 
 Neoliberalism and its consequent economic restructuring are often viewed in economic terms with little 
attention to the social and cultural dimensions of transformative change processes.  Gledhill's reference to the 
"new free-market enterprise culture" (1995:2) implies that the strategies, ideologies, and discourse of 
neoliberalism should be analyzed as culture content.  Both in policy and through discourse, a complex of cultural 
constructs defines the underlying premises of this culture.  First and foremost, paternalism must be eliminated by 
withdrawing subsidies and support to inefficient producers and workers, who become defined as "over-
employed," "backward," "lazy," and "ignorant."  In its place, new forms of management and organization are 
geared to rationalizing production in terms of efficiency, long-term profitability, and support of producers who are 
willing to assimilate and become "capitalists" and "businessmen."  This ideological base, then, manifests itself in 
a differentiation among various types of producers and workers, while it concentrates wealth in the hands of a few 
industrialists.   
 In the sugar sector, impressive gains were made in productivity, thus fulfilling neoliberal objectives; but in 
the interstices of this dynamic transformation the social basis and cultural traditions of cane growers and mill 
workers are being undermined.  Two cases are considered here to illustrate the diverse ways that communities 
have been affected by the imposition of neoliberalism in the Mexican countryside.  In both cases, cañero culture 
was historically constituted, drawing on traditions and ideologies formulated and reformulated in a revolutionary 
past through experiences of struggle and resistance against haciendas and sugar mills.  In one region, cañeros 
chose to accommodate to the neoliberal paradigm, but their economic success has been at the expense of less 
productive cañeros and liquidated mill workers.  In the second case, a policy of exclusion affected not just 
individuals, but an entire community.  While some cañeros were able to resume their relations with the nearby 
Pedernales mill, many of these same producers were also mill workers who lost their source of livelihood.  As a 
form of resistance to the mill closing, community members collectively drew on their cultural heritage, ideology, 





 Based on the diverse experiences of cane growers and mill workers, I argue that the social and cultural costs 
of economic triage should be carefully contemplated.  Privatization of sugar mills resulted in the erosion of social 
guarantees since "the longstanding responsibility of mill management...to address the needs of both the cane 
growers and the community surrounding the mill has not been assumed by the new group of mill owners" 
(Singelmann and Otero 1995:14).  Unseen behind the facade of neoliberal culture are the human costs--
unemployment, decreased health status, increased malnutrition, declining educational attainment, undermining of 
community enterprises, and escalating crime rates.  As entire communities are forgotten and the social costs of 
modernizing the Mexican countryside discounted, local residents are uniting on the basis of their shared cultural 
identities, appropriating new strategies of resistance, and refusing to disappear. 
 The cultural construction of cane and sugar production by mill workers and cane growers is expressed in 
manifold ways, by passing a heritage of knowledge and practice from generation to generation, through material 
resistance in the form of the takeover of the mill, and in an ideology that counterposes itself to the contradictions 
of modernizing neoliberalism.  A wall outside of the mill provides a media for expressing this ideology in artwork 
and graffiti:  "Zapata lives;" "An end to repression of campesinos;" next to a caricature of Salinas, "Puruarán, 
¿Didn't you like my government?  I am liberalism and the political parties are my accomplices;" and over a 
picture of the mill owner and the state governor someone wrote, "Corrupt traitors of the working people."  This 
wall symbolizes the reality of a people under siege, perhaps best expressed by the Comisariado Ejidal, "Puruarán 
is not a television show.  It is a reality that should be seen, but above all to live and be able to understand that the 
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Table 1.  Changes in Production at the National Level, 1988-89 to 1995-96. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    1988-89  1995-96  % Change 
 
Hectares harvested  510,596  570,598  11.75 
Tons of cane   34,893,129  40,185,213  15.17 
Yield/hectare (tons)  68.34  70.43  3.06 
Tons sugar    3,173,680   4,377,554  37.93 
Kg. Sugar/hectare  6,216  7,672  33.78 
% Sucrose in cane  11.65  13.46  23.42 
Factory Yield (%)   9.10  10.89  19.67 
Lost Time (%)   26.79  26.86    .26 
Consumption of  23.73  16.87  -28.91 
  petroleum (lts.) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 







Table 2.  Changes in Production at the Quesería Mill, 1988-89 to 1995-96. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Surface Field Yield Tons Factory 
Year  Tons Cane Harvested   Tons/ha.    Sugar     Yield 
1989 367,532 9,029.00 40.71 31,012  8.438 
1990 409,202 8,153.95 50.18 33,244  8.124 
1991 484,377 7,088.00 68.34 38,362  7.920 
1992 463,794 7,087.00 65.44 40,341  8.698 
1993 618,353 7,136.25 86.65 59,180  9.571 
1994 402,313 5,870.07 68.54 36,042  8.960 
1995 504,075 6,126.55 82.28 52,399 10.395 
1996 636,160 7,957.28 79.95 66,286 10.420 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 








Table 3.  Changes in Production at Pedernales and Puruarán, 1989-90 to 1995-96. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Surface Field Yield Tons Factory 
Year  Tons Cane Harvested   Tons/ha.     Sugar    Yield 
 
1990  
Puruarán 144,940 1,729 83.85 13,244 9.14  
Pedernales 261,176 2,594 100.70 25,621 9.81  
 
1991 
Puruarán 158,498 2,062 76.88 15,400 9.72 
Pedernales 256,463 2,566 99.95 26,955 10.51 
 
1992 
Puruarán 123,329 1,600 91.63 14,218 9.70 
Pedernales 191,540 2,196 87.52 19,708 10.26 
 
1993 
Pedernales 299,874 3,254 92.17 30,035 10.02 
 
1994 
Pedernales 261,758 3,498 74.83 28,010 10.70 
 
1995 
Pedernales 345,000 4,132 83.49 37,950 11.00 
 
1996 
Pedernales 382,111 4,196 91.06 43,607 11.41 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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